“9 Crazy, Mad Years with the Golden Calf and the ticker tape” Part 4

http://mobile.nytimes.com/article?a=727958

“Lacking his predecessor’s diplomatic skills, agitated by Soviet occupation policy in Eastern Europe and aggressive moves in the eastern Mediterranean and Iran, pressured by hard-liners in the Republican Party and from within his own administration, and facing a presidential election campaign in  1948, Truman believed he could no longer afford to follow Roosevelt’s conciliatory approach toward the Soviet Union. As a result, by 1947, a policy of containment had replaced one of conciliation.”  The Entangling Alliance by Ronald Powaski

Although Ronald Powaski is nonjudgmental, he does provide a very brief synopsis in two sentences of the Truman persona. Other writers fortunately are more forthcoming in their assessments of Truman. The general idea being that he was ill-prepared for the Presidency. Writers, from the other end, with a more positive bent towards Truman are more often than not promoting an agenda – the most common being the Truman doctrine, Containment policy and the NSC; none of which originated from him but from the bankers in his administration. As a domestic politician, he would have been an exemplary figure based on the trajectory of his career. But in the international arena, Truman was out of his depth. This is more than apparent in his published personal diaries and historical accounts. Personal assessments given by those within his administration and cabinet to instill confidence provide a glimpse of a person assuming responsibility for a country that was still at war. The most upbeat of these being a portrayal of Truman as being astute and well-read in international history. A glaring mismatch if ever there was one, which explains his supposedly marked reliance on his cabinet for advice. Faced with the responsibility of dealing with Churchill and Stalin, Truman was unsure of himself and sought advice from various sources – Eleanor Roosevelt adviced him on Churchill. Being a part of the post-war negotiations among the Big Three, he clearly lacked the chemistry needed to fulfill the vision embraced by FDR. Truman was without a doubt overshadowed by the strong personalities of both Churchill and Stalin.

As to the accusation that FDR said nothing about his postwar plans, FDR declared before a congressional joint session on March 1, 1945 that the Yalta meeting was a great success. But its final result, he said in a plea for an end to isolationism, would depend on the congress and the american people. Lasting results would require “active support” from both for “the general conclusions reached at Yalta.” The conference he declared, “ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balance of power, and all other expedients that have been tried for centuries – and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all of these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join. The results of the conference represented “the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace.” After having said this, I find it quite cycnical of Robert Dallek to have stated in his book “the Lost Peace” that he attributed FDR’s optimism to his debilitated condition which made him unrealistic. Granted, transitional periods are extremely dangerous because they are volatile. “A deep human bias projects past experience onto new situations; assuming that because an adversary or an ally or a battlefield is the same or similar, old rules must apply. Consequently, we end up fighting the previous war.” But, FDR, among other things, had the fortitude and resiliency to see things through. Consider this, after a Soviet-American clash over negotiations between German and U.S. representatives in Switzerland about the surrender of German forces in Italy, Stalin upbraided FDR and questioned his motives. From Stalin’s perspective, the germans were trying to free allied armies in the west to limit Soviet advances in the east. This would have been a temporary setback for someone in the best of health. FDR however was by this time showing signs of sickness and fatigue. In spite of this, FDR five days later came back and struck a more optimistic note with Churchill. FDR urged patience: “I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise everyday and most of them straighten out as in the case of the Bern meeting. We must be firm however, and our course thus far is correct.” This instance among many others exemplifies the cohesive dynamic that prevailed between Churchill, FDR and most importantly, Stalin. It was a dynamic that was able to weather the ups and downs. A dynamic of respect and comraderie that had to be built up over the years.

A comraderie moment which I found quite humorous was their first meeting in Tehran on November 1943: “Churchill passed a silver cigar case to his two colleagues with the inscription “To Winston: from his fellow conservatives, 1925.” Not to be outdone, Roosevelt sent a silver cigarette case around the room inscribed, “To Franklin from his Harvard classmates, 1904.” Refusing to be one-upped by the two capitalists, Stalin offered them cigarettes from a case that had found its way from Budapest into his possession with the inscription “To Count Karoli: from his friends at the jockey club, 1910.” Was this Stalin’s way of telling his capitalist colleagues that he remained a good communist, an advocate of redistributing wealth.” More often than not, Churchill would be on the receiving end of these jokes. Among the three leaders, Stalin was definitely a more demanding personality. This was understandable if you consider the fact that the Soviets at that point in time had a disproportionate share of war casualties – they accounted for close to half of the total casualties of the war effort. Additionally, FDR needed the Soviets to consummate the war effort with Japan. Notwithstanding these considerations, I can just picture FDR having the presence of mind and reassurance backed by an accumulated knowledge and skills based on his experiences in both business and government to have his sights and efforts focused on his set goals. It was a reassurance needed to navigate the tensions present during these conferences. Amongst the three leaders, only Roosevelt had this sense of reassurance and confidence which is apparent in photographs taken of all three together.

Another occasion for humor was a scheduled conference for Casablanca in Morocco, FDR sent a message to Churchill giving him the codenames that he and Hopkins, whom Churchill disliked, would use as their cover names – Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.

You may be wondering by now why I used Paul Krugman’s article “Can Europe be Saved?” as a link for this essay. Aside from him being some of the few writers I follow, he mentions Schuman’s proposal of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which I just happened to come across in my readings. I intend to use this as a springboard to express certain ideas. Ideas which may provide a framework to understand our current situation as being a result of events and actions taken during and post WW 2. It is important to note that events, by the time of the Schuman proposal, were going through the same dynamic which FDR was trying to circumvent through a consistent, continuous and deliberate effort applied; which is visibly apparent from his domestic agenda, best personified through his appointment of Frances Perkins and a comprehensive and well-planned international agenda. By comprehensive, I am referring to FDR’s skill not only as a politician attuned to realpolitik but more importantly, considering the downplaying and de-emphasis by the media, his knowledge of and background in Wall Street. FDR was well connected in Wall Street. This I strongly believe would prove to be an invaluable resource for dealing with, not only Stalin but more importantly the bankers within his administration. In addition to being employed in Wall Street in various capacities during the 20’s, FDR had a history, in both the maternal and paternal side, of important associations with Wall Street. Both the Roosevelt and the Delano families were associated with Wall Street and New York banking since the 18th century. On the Delano side, they were associated with the foundings of the Federal Reserve, the Railroad Industry, The Insurance Industry and Brown Brothers (eventually Brown Brothers and Harriman). On the Roosevelt side,  they were founders of Bank of New York and Roosevelt & Son ( a Wall Street firm). As a result, FDR was not only well aware of the considerable american investments made in Russia but, in contrast to Truman, would have had the finesse and aplomb to fulfill his Vision.

Investments from a wide spectrum of Big Corporate names were aggressively made beginning with the Bolshevik Revolution and henceforth. Corporate names such as Standard Oil, General Electric, Dupont, Ford Motors, Caterpillar, Siemens, Westinghouse and JP Morgan just to name a few. It is also important to realize that these investments were made in conjunction with other companies that, if not subsidiaries, were associated through various means and interests. Companies and concerns such as Shell Oil, Krupp Industries, The Rothschilds, Deutsche Bank and many others had vast investments in Russia. Some ideas of the New Deal were derived from these investments. The National Recovery Administration (NRA) had Gerard Swope (Pres. Of GE) as its President and Walter Teagle (Chairman of Standard Oil) as VP. Walter Teagle may have been bypassed by Swope probably due to FDR’s well-known dislike for Standard Oil. In this regard, appearances are deceiving. Standard Oil was the first and only company that, at the time, had more than half of its profits derived from overseas investments. Furthermore, in terms of revenues and employment, Corporations had, for the first time in history, gained the upperhand and were ascendant as opposed to the financial industry.

The ECSC proposed by Schuman was actually part of a chain of events which actually started with Harriman’s failure to fulfill his part in a loan process which started during the first Moscow Conference in Sept 1941. Stalin fulfilled his obligation as a part of the conditions stipulated for the loan. In a sequence of events, Stalin initially dissolved the Comintern on May 1943. In September, Government anti-religion policy ended allowing churches and seminaries to reopen, citizens to attend religious services and the Russian Orthodox church to publish a journal. As a form of leverage during the war, FDR probably had an interest to delay approval of the loan. However, barring his unfortunate demise midterm, approval of these loans would have been more than a certainty. Why do I say this? In addition to his command and control (again, in contrast to Truman) of the people in his administration, FDR saw Soviet Russia less as a menace to western democracies than as a potential ally against fascism. In 1919-20 when the first Red Scare, a reaction against anarchists and Bolsheviks swept the U.S., FDR refused to join the hysteria. It is important to note that FDR saw the Soviet Union as more of a domestic problem, in terms of the isolationist issue, than a threat to America and other democracies. As such, FDR would have been able to see through the smoke screen made by the Wall Street men within his administration. Unlike Eisenhower and Congress who realized too late in the game that they created the beast called the military-industrial complex and the NSC, FDR would have been way ahead of the game and aborted such an attempt. FDR would have seen the bankers game as a ploy to fill their coffers in perpetuity. In this game that has been played for centuries, the Soviets would become convenient adversaries and would be a perfect fit in the bankers equation of Fear and Greed.

The Game had started even prior to the Truman Doctrine speech. With victory and wars end approaching, It is discomfitting to read how things devolved upon Trumans’ assumption of the Presidency. Most pronounced were the manipulations deviced to legitimize the Soviet threat. With a clear mind, one can discern the irrationality of the disproportionate and neurotic responses towards this presumed threat. Discernment of this irrationality is essential to free oneself from this shroud of deceit. It is a liberating process essential for critical thought. Unfortunately, it can prove to be a slow and difficult process in an environment wherein the institutions of free thought missappropriate its means and devices to inculcate this shroud of deceit. As such, one can never overemphasize the importance of this realization. The forces alligned against this possibility being freely accessible to anyone are many to say the least. Needless to say, realization of this irrationality will, in turn allow you to confront and analyze the threat for what it really is. 

Legitimization of the Soviet threat came about through various forms and devices. It is common knowledge that the seeds of the Containment Policy was derived from George Kennan’s cable “The Long Telegram.” And yet, almost a year prior to this cable both W. Averell Harriman and, then Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal (former Dillon Read & Co banker), addressing the U.N., conveyed the Soviet threat in military terms. In this regard, I find it hard to believe that George Kennan was unaware of the current state of affairs – a public disclosure at that. In fact, Kennan states in a lecture delivered at Grinnell College on 1/26/1984: “One of the most interesting subjects for historical inquiry would be, even today, the reasons why the conclusion derived, in 1949, by the people in Washington – Pentagon, the White House, and the Dept of State – that there was a real danger of the Soviets unleashing, in the fairly near future, what would have been WW 3.” He then goes on to say:”What was wrong was that they became subject, at the hands of those who cultivated this image, to a regime of oversimplification, exagerration, misinterpretation, and propogandistic distortion that had the cumulative effect  of turning a serious but not unmanageable problem into what appeared to many people to be a hopeless, insoluble one – insoluble, that is, other than by some sort of apocalyptic military denouement. ” Here was a man who, never having met Stalin, would give a detailed psychological profile of Stalin with a complete Freudian analysis and, yet for some reason, would prove unable to gauge the sentiments of people he related to on a regular basis.

The actual international state of affairs was that Socialism and, by default due to the shared wellspring of Marxist thought, Communism as an ideology had infused itself into vast areas of the European Continent in thought and sentiment. In Asia, it was a sentiment shared by Mao Tse Tung of China. America and the United Kingdom would not be immune from these influences. Faced with an ideological onslaught and too soon after an immense war effort, the bankers with their habitual predilection to prognosticate found themselves in an emergency that had to be portrayed as an insurmountable threat to justify their response. A response that in essence was a choice made for the survival of Capitalism at the expense of hunger and poverty. In light of this, I am reminded of what FDR said: “the issue was not whether the USA could make the world safe for democracy but whether democracy could make the world safe from another war.”

By the time of the Schuman proposal, the bureaucracy of warfare became an overriding reality with the peace economy virtually nonexistent and subsumed to this normal state of affairs. Prior to this proposal, a sense of urgency and panic ensued as a result of the explosion of the Soviets first nuclear device on August 1949 by which Congress passed a Mutual Defense Assistance Act two months after. This provided the European allies with $1 billion in mutual aid. One of the stipulations of this package was that an allied organizational structure had to be created which would formulate a joint defense plan. From this primary beginning of a European Union, NATO was formed as an offshoot of both the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 and the Brussels Pact in 1948. The idea of a European Union would go through a gradual process of change in response to the German issue of rearmanent. Though the Schuman plan did formulate the framework for a Common Market, it lacked a political feature. Through the added urgency of the Korean War, this feature would be addressed by both the Plevan plan and the Spofford compromise. In this foundation of a European Union, the USA would find a willing partner in the game of nations. The basic premise of this thinking is that international politics is a game of power. To quote an unknown source: “Power in the game of nations is the capacity to dominate by using the technology of intimidation. Once the capacity to dominate is established, the winners may, as in the case of defeated Germany and Japan, pay the losers substantial amounts of money for the privelege of winning. Indeed, they have to do it to keep the playing field in repair. “